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"A staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, which is 
moved by a man." Aristotle, Physics, 251ia. 
I. The metaphysical problem of human freedom might be 
summarized in the following way: Human beings are responsible 
agents; but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of 
human action (the view that every event that is involved in an act 
is caused by some other event); and it also appears to conflict with 
an indeterministic view of human action (the view that the act, or 
some event that is essential to the act, is not caused at all). To solve 
the problem, I believe, we must make somewhat far-reaching as-
sumptions about the self or the agent-about the man who performs 
the act. 
Perhaps it is needless to remark that, in all likelihood, it is 
impossible to say anything significant about this ancient problem 
that has not been said before. t 
2. Let us consider some deed, or misdeed, that may be attributed 
to a responsible agent: one man, say, shot another. If the man was 
responsible for what he did, then, I would urge, what was to 
happen at the time of the shooting was something that was 
entirely up to the man himself. There was a moment at which it 
was true, both that he could have fired the shot and also that he 
could have refrained from firing it. And if this is so, then, even 
though he did fire it, he could have done something else instead. 
(He didn't find himself firing the shot "against his will," as we 
say.) I think we can say, more generally, then, that if a man is 
responsible for a certain event or a certain state of affairs (in our 
example, the shooting of another man), then that event or state 
1 The general position to be presented here is suggested in the following 
writings, among others: Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, Book II, Ch. 6; 
Nicomachea11 Ethics, Book Ill, Ch. 1-5; Thomas Reid, Esst~p em the Active 
Powers of Man; C. A. Campbell, "Is '1-'ree Will' a Pseudo-Problem?" 1\find, 
N.S. Vol. LX (1951), pp. 441-465; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Responsibility and 
Avoidability," and Richard Taylor, "Determination and the Theory of Agency," 
in Sidney Hook, ed., Determinism and Freedom in tire Age of Modern .'icie11ce 
(New York 1958). 
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of affairs was brought about by some act of his, and the act was 
something that was in his power either to perform or not to perform. 
But now if the act which he did perform was an act that was 
also in his power not to perform, then it could not have been 
caused or determined by any event that was not itself within his 
power either to bring about or not to bring about. For example, 
if what we say he did was really something that was brought about 
by a second man, one who forced his hand upon the trigger, say, 
or who, by means of hypnosis, compelled him to perform the act, 
then since the act was caused by the second man it was nothing that 
was within the power of the first man to prevent. And precisely 
the same thing is true, I think, if instead of referring to a second 
man who compelled the first one, we speak instead of the desires 
and beliefs which the first man happens to have had. For if what 
we say he did was really something that was brought about by his 
own beliefs and desires, if these beliefs and desires in the particular 
situation in which he happened to have found himself caused him 
to do just what it was that we say he did do, then, since ihey caused 
it, he was unable to do anything other than just what it was that 
he did do. It makes no difference whether the cause of the deed 
was internal or external; if the cause was some state or event for 
which the man himself was not responsible, then he was not respon· 
sible for what we have been mistakenly calling his act. If a flood 
caused the poorly constructed dam to break, then, given the flood 
and the constitution of the dam, the break, we may say, had to 
occur and nothing could have happened in its place. And if the 
flood of desire caused the weak-willed man to give in, then he, too, 
had to do just what it was that he did do and he was no more 
responsible than was the dam for the results that followed. (It is 
true, of course, that if the man is responsible for the beliefs and 
desires that he happens to have, then he may also be responsible 
for the things they lead him to do. But the question now becomes: 
is he responsible for the beliefs and desires he happens to have? If 
he is, then there was a time when they were within his power either 
to acquire or not to acquire, and we are left, therefore, with our 
general point.) 
One may object: But surely if there were such a thing as a man 
who is really good, then he would be responsible for things that 
he would do; yet, he would be unable to do anything other than 
just what it is that he does do, since, being good, he will always 
choose to do what is best. The answer, I think, is suggested by a 
4 
comment that Thomas Reid makes upon an ancient author. The 
author had said of Cato, "He was good because he could not be 
otherwise," and Reid observes: "This saying, if understood literally 
and strictly, is not the praise of Cato, but of his constitution, 
which was no more the work of Cato than his existence."2 I£ Cato 
was himself responsible for the good things that he did, then Cato, 
as Reid suggests, was such that, although he had the power to do 
what was not good, he exercised his power only for that which 
was good. 
All of this, if it is true, may give a certain amount of comfort 
to those who are tender-minded. But we should remind them that 
it also conflicts with a familiar view about the nature of God-
with the view that St. Thomas Aquinas expresses by saying that 
"every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God 
as the Prime Mover."3 I£ the act of the sinner did proceed from 
God as the Prime Mover, then God was in the position of the 
second agent we just discussed-the man who forced the trigger 
finger, or the hypnotist-and the sinner, so-called, was not respon-
sible for what he did. (This may be a bold assertion, in view of 
the history of western theology, but I must say that I have never 
encountered a single good reason for denying it.) 
There is one standard objection to all of this and we should 
consider it briefly. 
3. The objection takes the form of a strategem-one designed 
to show that determinism (and divine providence) is consistent 
with human responsibility. The strategem is one that was used by 
Jonathan Edwards and by many philosophers in the present cen-
tury, most notably, G. E. Moore.t 
One proceeds as follows: The expression 
(a) He could have done othenvise, 
it is argued, means no more nor less than 
(b) I£ he had chosen to do othenvise, then he would have 
done otherwise. 
{In place of "chosen," one might say "tried," "set out," "decided," 
"undertaken," or "willed.") The truth of statement (b), it is then 
pointed out, is consistent with determinism (and with divine 
"Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Ma11, Essay IV, Chapter 4 
(Works, p. 600). 
3 Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part, Question VI ("On the 
Voluntary and Involuntary"). 
• Jonathan Edwards, F1·eedom of the Will (New Haven 1957); G. E. Moore, 
Ethics (Home University Library 1912), Chapter Six. 
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providence}; for even if all of the man's actions were causally 
determined, the man could still be such that, if he had chosen other-
wise, then he would have done othcnvisc. 'Vhat the murderer saw, 
let us suppose, along with his beliefs and desires, caused him to fire 
the shot; yet he was such that if, just then, he had chosen or decided 
not to fire the shot, then he would not have fired it. All of this is 
certainly possible. Similarly, we could say, of the dam, that the 
flood caused it to break and also that the dam was such that, if 
there had been no flood or any similar pressure, then the dam would 
have remained intact. And therefore, the argument proceeds, if (b) 
is consistent with determinism, and if (a) and (b) say the same 
thing, then (a) is also consistent with determinism; hence we can 
say that the agent could have done othenvise even though he was 
caused to do what he did do; and therefore determinism and moral 
responsibility arc compatible. 
Is the argument sound? The conclusion follows from the 
premises, but the catch, I think, ties in the first premise-the one 
saying that statement (a) tells us no more nor less than what 
statement (b) tells us. For (b), it would seem, could be true while 
(a) is false. That is to say, our man might be such that, if he had 
chosen to do otherwise, then he would have done othenvise, and 
yet also such that he could not have done otherwise. Suppose, 
after all, that our murderer could not have chosen, or could not 
have decided, to do otherwise. Then the fact that he happens also 
to be a man such that, if he had chosen not to shoot he would not 
have shot, would make no difference. For if he could not have 
chosen not to shoot, then he could not have done anything other 
than just what it was that he did do. In a word: from our state-
ment (b) above ("If he had chosen to do otherwise, then he would 
have done otherwise"), we cannot make an inference to (a) above 
("He could have done othenvise") unless we can also assert: 
(c) He could have chosen to do othenvise. 
And therefore, if we must reject this third statement (c), then, 
even though we may be justified in asserting (b), we are not justi-
fied in asserting (a). 1£ the man could not have chosen to do other-
wise, then he would not have done otherwise-even if he was such 
that, if he had chosen to do othcn\•ise, then he would have done 
othenvise. 
The strategem in question, then, seems to me not to work, and 
I would say, therefore, that the ascription of responsibility conflicts 
with a deterministic view of action. 
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4. Perhaps there is less need to argue that the ascription of 
responsibility also conflicts with an indeterministic view of action 
-with the view that the act, or some event that is essential to the 
act, is not caused at all. If the act-the firing of the shot-was not 
caused at all, if it was fortuitous or capricious, happening so to 
speak out of the blue, then, presumably, no one-and nothing-
was responsible for the act. Our conception of action, therefore, 
should be neither deterministic nor indeterministic. Is there any 
other possibility? 
5. We must not say that every event involved in the act is caused 
by some other event; and we must not say that the act is something 
that is not caused at all. The possibility that remains, therefore, is 
this: We should say that at least one of the events that are involved 
in the act is caused, not by any other events, but by something else 
instead. And this something else can only be the agent-the man. 
If there is an event that is caused, not by other events, but by the 
man, then there are some events involved in the act that are not 
caused by other events. But if the event in question is caused by the 
man then it is caused and we are not committed to saying that 
there is something involved in the act that is not caused at all. 
But this, of course, is a large consequence, implying something 
of considerable importance about the nature of the agent or the 
man. 
6. If we consider only inanimate natural objects, we may say 
that causation, if it occurs, is a relation between events or states of 
affairs. The dam's breaking was an event that was caused by a set 
of other events-the dam being weak, the flood being strong, and 
so on. But if a man is responsible for a particular deed, then, if 
what I have said is true, there is some event, or set of events, that 
is caused, not by other events or states of affairs, but by the agent, 
whatever he may be. 
I shall borrow a pair of medieval terms, using them, perhaps, in 
a way that is slightly different from that for which they were 
originally intended. I shall say that when one event or state of 
affairs (or set of events or states of affairs) causes some other event 
or state of affairs, then we have an instance of transeunt causation. 
And I shall say that when an agent, as distinguished from an event, 
causes an event or state of affairs, then we have an instance of 
immanent causation. 
The nature of what is intended by the expression "immanent 
causation" may be illustrated by this sentence from Aristotle's 
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Physics: "Thus, a staff moves a stone, and is moved by a hand, 
which is moved by a man." (VII, 5, 256a, 6-8) If the man was 
responsible, then we have in this illustration a number of instances 
of causation-most of them transeunt but at least one of them 
immanent. What the staff did to the stone was an instance of 
transeunt causation, and thus we may describe it as a relation 
between events: "the motion of the staff caused the motion of 
the stone." And similarly for what the hand did to the staff: "the 
motion of the hand caused the motion of the staff." And, as we 
know from physiology, there are still other events which caused 
the motion of the hand. Hence we need not introduce the agent 
at this particular point, as Aristotle does-we need not, though we 
may. We may say that the hand was moved by the man, but we 
may also say that the motion of the hand was caused by the motion 
of certain muscles; and we may say that the motion of the muscles 
was caused by certain events that took place within the brain. But 
some event, and presumably one of those that took place within 
the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other events. 
There are, of course, objections to this way of putting the matter; 
I shall consider the two that seem to me to be most important. 
7. One may object, firstly: "I£ the man does anything, then, 
as Aristotle's remark suggests, what he does is to move the hand. 
But he certainly does not do anything to his brain-he may not 
even know that he has a brain. And if he doesn't do anything to 
the brain, and if the motion of the hand was caused by something 
that happened within the brain, then there is no point in appealing 
to 'immanent causation' as being something incompatible with 
'transeunt causation'-for the whole thing, after all, is a matter of 
causal relations among events or states of affairs." 
The answer to this objection, I think, is this: It is true that 
the agent does not do anything with his brain, or to his brain, in 
the sense in which he does something with his hand and does some· 
thing to the staff. But from this it does not follow that the agent 
was not the immanent cause of something that happened within 
his brain. 
We should note a useful distinction that has been proposed by 
Professor A. I. Melden-namely, the distinction between "making 
something A happen" and "doing A.''ll I£ I reach for the staff and 
• A. I. Me1den, Free Action (London 1961), especially Chapter Three. Mr. 
Me1den's own views, however, are quite the contrary of those that are proposed 
here. 
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pick it up, then one of the things that I do is just that-reach for 
the staff and pick it up. And if it is something that I do, then 
there is a very clear sense in which it may be said to be something 
that I know that I do. I£ you ask me, "Arc you doing something, 
or trying to do something, with the staff?", I will have no difficulty 
in finding an answer. But in doing something with the staff, I also 
make various things happen which are not in this same sense things 
that I do: I will make various air-particles move; I will free a 
number of blades of grass from the pressure that had been upon 
them; and I may cause a shadow to move from one place to 
another. If these are merely things that I make happen, as distin-
guished from things that I do, then I may know nothing whatever 
about them; I may not have the slightest idea that, in moving the 
staff, I am bringing about any such thing as the motion of air-
particles, shadows, and blades of grass. 
We may say, in answer to the first objection, therefore, that it 
is true that our agent does nothing to his brain or with his brain; 
but from this it does not follow that the agent is not the immanent 
cause of some event within his brain; for the brain event may be 
something which, like the motion of the air-particles, he made 
happen in picking up the staff. The only difference between the 
two cases is this: in each case, he made something happen when he 
picked up the staff; but in the one case-the motion of the air-
particles or of the shadows-it was the motion of the staff that 
caused the event to happen; and in the other case-the event that 
took place in the brain-it was this event that caused the motion 
of the staff. 
The point is, in a word, that whenever a man does something 
A, then (by "immanent causation") he makes a certain cerebral 
event happen, and this cerebral event (by "transeunt causation") 
makes A happen. 
8. The second objection is more difficult and concerns the very 
concept of "immanent causation," or causation by an agent, as this 
concept is to be interpreted here. The concept is subject to a diffi-
culty which has long been associated with that of the prime mover 
unmoved. We have said that there must be some event A, presum-
ably some cerebral event, which is caused not by any other event, 
but by the agent. Since A was not caused by any other event, then 
the agent himself cannot be said to have undergone any change or 
produced any other event (such as "an act of will" or the like) 
which brought A about. But if, when the agent made A happen, 
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there was no event involved other than A itself, no event which 
could be described as malting A happen, what did the agent's causa-
tion consist of? What, for example, is the difference between A's 
just happening, and the agent's causing A to happen? We cannot 
attribute the difference to any event that took place within the 
agent. And so far as the event A itself is concerned, there would 
seem to be no discernible difference. Thus Aristotle said that the 
activity of the prime mover is nothing in addition to the motion 
that it produces, and Suarez said that "the action is in reality 
nothing but the effect as it flows from the agent."6 Must we con-
clude, then, that there is no more to the man's action in causing 
event A than there is to the event A's happening by itself? Here 
we would seem to have a distinction without a difference-in which 
case we have failed to find a via media between a deterministic 
and an indeterministic view of action. 
The only answer, I think, can be this: that the difference 
between the man's causing A, on the one hand, and the event A 
just happening, on the other, lies in the fact that, in the first case 
but not the second, the Event A was caused and was caused by the 
man. There was a brain event A; the agent did, in fact, cause the 
brain event; but there was nothing that he did to cause it. 
This answer may not entirely satisfy and it will be likely to 
provoke the following question: "But what are you really adding 
to the assertion that A happened when you utter the words 'The 
agent caused A to happen'?" As soon as we have put the question 
this way, we see, I think, that whatever difficulty we may have 
encountered is one that may be traced to the concept of causation 
generally-whether "immanent" or "transeunt." The problem, in 
other words, is not a problem that is peculiar to our conception of 
human action. It is a problem that must be faced by anyone who 
makes use of the concept of causation at all; and therefore, I would 
say, it is a problem for everyone but the complete indeterminist. 
For the problem, as we put it, referring just to "immanent 
causation," or causation by an agent, was this: "\-\'hat is the differ-
ence between saying, of an event A, that A just happened and saying 
that someone caused A to happen?" The analogous problem, which 
holds for "transeunt causation," or causation by an event, is this: 
"\¥hat is the difference between saying, of two events A and B, that 
B happened and then A happened, and saying that B's happening 
"Aristotle, Pllysics, Book III, Chapter 3; Suarez, Disprttntimws Metnplly.ficne, 
Disputation 18, Section 10. 
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was the cause o£ A's happening?" And the only answer that one 
can give is this-that in the one case the agent was the cause of A's 
happening and in the other case event B was the cause of A's 
happening. The nature of transeunt causation is no more clear 
than is that of immanent causation. 
9. But we may plausibly say-and there is a respectable philo-
sophical tradition to which we may appeal-that the notion o£ 
immanent causation, or causation by an agent, is in fact more clear 
than that of transeunt causation, or causation by an event, and that 
it is only by understanding our own causal efficacy, as agents, that 
we can grasp the concept of cause at all. Hume may be said to have 
shown that we do not derive the concept of cause from what we 
perceive of external things. How, then, do we derive it? The most 
plausible suggestion, it seems to me, is that of Reid, once again: 
namely that "the conception of an efficient cause may very probably 
be derived from the experience we have had ... of our own power 
to produce certain elfects."1 If we did not understand the concept 
of immanent causation, we would not understand that of transeunt 
causation. 
10. It may have been noted that I have avoided the term "free 
will" in all of this. For even if there is such a faculty as "the will," 
which somehow sets our acts agoing, the question of freedom, as 
John Locke said, is not the question "whether the will be free"; it 
is the question "whethe1· a man l1e free."s For if there is a "will," 
as a moving faculty, the question is whether the man is free to will to 
do those things that he does will to do-and also whether he is free 
not to will any of those things that he does will to do, and, again, 
whether he is free to will any of those things that he does not will 
to do. Jonathan Edwards tried to restrict himself to the question-
"Is the man free to do what it is that he wills?"-but the answer to 
this question will not tell us whether the man is responsible for 
what it is that he does will to do. Using still another pair of 
medieval terms, we may say that the metaphysical problem of 
freedom does not concern the actus imperatus; it does not concern 
the question whether we are free to accomplish whatever it is that 
we will or set out to do; it concerns the actus elicitus, the question 
whether we are free to will or to set out to do those things that we 
do will or set out to do. 
• Reid, Works, p. 524. 
• E.uay cot1cernit1g lluma11 Uuder.~lamlit~g, 1\ook II, Chapter XXI. 
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11. If we are responsible, and if what I have been trying to say 
is true, then we have a prerogative which some would attribute 
only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. 
In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and 
nothing-or no one-causes us to cause those events to happen. 
12. If we are thus prime movers unmoved and if our actions, or 
those for which we are responsible, are not causally determined, 
then they are not causally determined by our desires. And this 
means that the relation between what we want or what we desire, 
on the one hand, and what it is that we do, on the other, is not 
as simple as most philosophers would have it. 
We may distinguish between what we might call the "Hobbist 
approach" and what we might call the "Kantian approach" to this 
question. The Hobbist approach is the one that is generally accept-
ed at the present time, but the Kantian approach, I believe, is the 
one that is true. According to Hobbism, if we know, of some man, 
what his beliefs and desires happen to be and how strong they are, 
if we know what he feels certain of, what he desires more than 
anything else, and if we know the state of his body and what stimuli 
he is being subjected to, then we may deduce, logically, just what 
it is that he will do-or, more accurately, just what it is that he will 
try, set out, or undertake to do. Thus Professor Melden has said 
that "the connection between wanting and doing is logical."O But 
according to the Kantian approach to our problem, and this is the 
one that I would take, there is no such logical connection between 
wanting and doing, nor need there even be a causal connection. No 
set of statements about a man's desires, beliefs, and stimulus situa-
tion at any time implies any statement telling us what the man 
will try, set out, or undertake to do at that time. As Reid put it, 
though we may "reason from men's motives to their actions and, 
in many cases, with great probability," we can never do so "with 
absolute certainty."lo 
This means that, in one very strict sense of the terms, there can 
be no science of man. If we think of science as a matter of finding 
out what laws happen to hold, and if the statement of a law tells 
us what kinds of events are caused by what other kinds of events, 
then there will be human actions which we cannot explain by 
subsuming them under any laws. We cannot say, "It is causally 
necessary that, given such and such desires and beliefs, and being 
• op.cit., p. 166. 
1o Reid, JVorks, pp. 608, 612. 
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subject to such and such stimuli, the agent will do so and so." For 
at times the agent, if he chooses, may rise above his desires and do 
something else instead. 
But all of this is consistent with saying that, perhaps more often 
than not, our desires do exist under conditions such that those 
conditions necessitate us to act. And we may also say, with Leibniz, 
that at other times our desires may "incline without necessitating." 
13. Leibniz's phrase presents us with our final philosophical 
problem. 'What does it mean to say that a desire, or a motive, might 
"incline without necessitating"? There is a temptation, certainly, 
to say that "to incline" means to cause and that "not to necessitate" 
means not to cause, but obviously we cannot have it both ways. 
Nor will Leibniz's own solution do. In his letter to Coste, he 
puts the problem as follows: "When a choice is proposed, for 
example to go out or not to go out, it is a question whether, with 
all the circumstances, internal and external, motives, perceptions, 
dispositions, impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, I am 
still in a contingent state, or whether I am necessitated to make the 
choice, for example, to go out; that is to say, whether this proposi-
tion true and determined in fact, /n all these circumstances taken 
together I shall choose to go out, is contingent or necessary."ll 
Leibniz's answer might be put as follows: in one sense of the terms 
"necessary" and "contingent," the proposition "In all these circum-
stances taken together I shall choose to go out," may be said to be 
contingent and not necessary, and in another sense of these terms, 
it may be said to be necessary and not contingent. But the sense in 
which the proposition may be said to be contingent, according to 
Leibniz, is only this: there is no logical contradiction involved in 
denying the proposition. And the sense in which it may be said to 
be necessary is this: since "nothing ever occurs without cause or 
determining reason," the proposition is causally necessary. "\Vhen-
ever all the circumstances taken together are such that the balance 
of deliberation is heavier on one side than on the other, it is certain 
and infallible that that is the side that is going to win out." But 
if what we have been saying is true, the proposition "In all these 
circumstances taken together I shall choose to go out," may be 
causally as well as logically contingent. Hence we must find another 
interpretation for Leibniz's statement that our motives and desires 
11 "Lettre a Mr. Coste de Ia N~ccssit~ et de Ia Contingence" (1707) in OfJtra 
Philosophica, cd. Erdmann, pp. 447-449. 
may incline us, or influence us, to choose without thereby necessi-
tating us to choose. 
Let us consider a public official who has some moral scruples 
but who also, as one says, could be had. Because of the scruples that 
he does have, he would never take any positive steps to receive a 
bribe-he would not actively solicit one. But his morality has its 
limits and he is also such that, if we were to confront him with a 
fait accompli or to let him see what is about to happen ($10,000 in 
cash is being deposited behind the garage), then he would succumb 
and be unable to resist. The general situation is a familiar one and 
this is one reason that people pray to be delivered from temptation. 
(It also justifies Kant's remark: "And how many there are who may 
have led a long blameless life, who are only fortunate in having 
escaped so many temptations."12 Our relation to the misdeed that 
we contemplate may not be a matter simply of being able to bring it 
about or not to bring it about. As St. Anselm noted, there are at 
least four possibilities. 'Ve may illustrate them by reference to our 
public official and the event which is his receiving the bribe, in the 
following way: (i) he may be able to bring the event about himself 
(facere esse), in which case he would actively cause himself to receive 
the bribe; (ii) he may be able to refrain from bringing it about 
himself (non facere esse), in which case he would not himself do 
anything to insure that he receive the bribe; (iii) he may be able to 
do something to prevent the event from occurring (facere non esse), 
in which case he would make sure that the $10,000 was not left 
behind the garage; or (iv) he may be unable to do anything to 
prevent the event from occurring (rwn facere non esse), in which 
case, though he may not solicit the bribe, he would allow himsel£ 
to keep it.1s We have envisaged our official as a man who can resist 
the temptation to (i) but cannot resist the temptation to (iv): he 
can refrain from bringing the event about himself, but he cannot 
bring himself to do anything to prevent it. 
Let us think of "inclination without necessitation," then, in 
such terms as these. First we may contrast the two propositions: 
10 In the Preface to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, in T. K. Abbott, ed., 
Kant's Critiq11e of Practical Reason and Oilier Works on the Theory of Ethics 
(London 1959), p. 303. 
•• Cf. D. P. Henry, ''Saint Anselm's De 'Grammatico'," Pllilosopllical Q~tar­
terly, Vol. X (1960), pp. 115-126. St. Anselm noted that (i) and (iii), respectively, 
may be thought of as forming the upper left and the upper right corners of a 
square of opposition, and (ii) and (iv) the lower left and the lower right. 
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(I) He can resist the temptation to do something in order 
to make A happen; 
(2) He can resist the temptation to allow A to happen (i.e., 
to do nothing to prevent A from happening). 
We may suppose that the man has some desire to have A happen 
and thus has a motive for making A happen. His motive for making 
A happen, I suggest, is one that necessitates provided that, because 
of the motive, (1) is false; he cannot resist the temptation to do 
something in order to make A happen. His motive for making A 
happen is one that inc.lines provided that, because of the motive, 
(2) is false; like our public official, he cannot bring himself to do 
anything to prevent A from happening. And therefore we can say 
that his motive for making A happen is one that inclines intt does 
not necessitate provided that, because of the motive, (I) is true and 
(2) is false; he can resist the temptation to make it happen but he 
cannot resist the temptation to allow it to happen. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy 
Roberts, the chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in 
the Graduate Magazine that 
the Chancellor should invite to the University for a lecture 
or a series of lectures, some outstanding national or world 
figure to speak on "Values of Living"-just as the late 
Chancellor proposed to do in his courses "The Human 
Situation" and "Plan for Living." 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of 
the Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that 
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of 
social betterment by bringing to the University each year 
outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, 
yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to 
come, if it is deemed wise, this living memorial could take 
some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor 
Everett C. Hughes, and has been published by the University of 
Kansas School of Law as part of his book Students' Culture and 
Perspectives: Lectures on Medical and General Education. The 
selection of lecturers for the Lindley series has since been delegated 
to the Department of Philosophy. The following lectures have been 
published, and may be obtained from the Department at a price of 
fifty cents each. 
1961. "The Idea of Man-An Outline of Philosophical Anthro· 
pology." 
By Jose Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr 
College. 
1962. "Changes in Events and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Man-
chester. 
1963. Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language." 
By Richard B. Brandt, Professor of Philosophy, Swarthmore 
College. 
